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RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
The major premise of Paul Butler's paper is that the relation
of African Americans to the criminal justice system is beset with
deep and intractable problems.' I readily agree, as would many.
Professor Butler traces these problems to past and present
discrimination against African Americans. He proposes two kinds
of remedies: More lenient rules of criminal law and procedure
that would apply only to African American defendants, and rules
of mandated proportionality by race in administration of the
drugs laws and of the prisons.2
Professor Butler labels his proposals affirmative action, racial
preferences for blacks. For some proposals, I disagree with his
designation. He argues that police practices discriminate against
African Americans, as do the practices of prosecutors and juries
in death penalty cases.' These forms of present discrimination
are hard to challenge in the courts because of the need to
establish discriminatory intent of officials.4 However, the
Supreme Court's rules do not preclude, indeed they sometimes
invite, legislative remedies.' To the extent that Professor Butler's
measures are aimed at countering these forms of discrimination
against black defendants, they are legislative remedies for
present discrimination and thus not race preferences.
However, Professor Butler's proposals go well beyond
remedies for specific kinds of present discrimination, and most of
them are indeed properly called affirmative action. While these
proposals are novel, they share an important feature with
traditional kinds of affirmative action. That feature is the need
for political power to undertake the proposals. These are not
judicial remedies. Moreover, the smallest governmental unit
involved is a state, that is, these measures would require the
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. See Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 841 (1997).
2. See id. at 877. Of course, proportionality can be achieved by arresting and
jailing more whites. In the case of the drugs laws, that response does not seem far-
fetched.
3. See id. at 864.
4. See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
5. See, e.g., id. at 319.
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assent of at least a statewide political majority.
As he concedes, the political will does not exist to enact his
recommendations.6 But if the political power were there, I would
use it differently to attack the Same problems. I would funda-
mentally overhaul the drugs laws along the lines of the systems
in use in Western Europe, not legalizing drugs, but forgoing the
search and destroy mentality. More emphasis should be placed
on rehabilitation.' Done right, the result would be much less
incarceration for drugs offenses, which would especially affect
African Americans for the reasons Professor Butler states.8
As an aside, during the last presidential campaign, Senator
Dole accused President Clinton of deemphasizing the war on
drugs.9 I recall hoping that Dole was right about that.
Next, I would deploy political power to change the relations
of communities of color with the police in numerous and basic
ways.1° Again the effect would be strongly, though not exclu-
sively, felt in the African American community.
Finally, I would apply political power to abolish the death
penalty. Of course, in my hypothetical world, there would be
popular support to do that by legislative action. I believe this
reform would have no effect on the crime rate, and the overall
numbers involved would be small, but the effect on attitudes
among African Americans would nevertheless be very great.
Amid all the hoopla of polling to measure attitudes about the
Simpson case, the polls quietly go on telling us that African
Americans are much less favorable to the death penalty than are
other Americans, in large measure because of the perception that
its administration is racially biased."
6. See Butler, supra note 1, at 879.
7. See Robert MacCoun et al., Comparing Drug Policies in North America and
Western Europe, in POLICIES AND STRATEGIES TO COMBAT DRUGS IN EUROPE 197
(Georges Estievenart ed., 1995).
8. See Butler, supra note 1, at 887.
9. See Eric Pianin, Dole Slams Clinton, the "Liberal Media" 'Wake Up,
America,"He Implores Voters, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1996, at Al.
10. The crucial task is to achieve trust and cooperation between the police-and
law-abiding African Americans, who very much want safer communities, but on just
terms.
11. See Linnet Myers, Death Penalty Issue Splits Black Community, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 13, 1995, at N3. As this article recites, recent polls show increasing support for
the death penalty among black Americans as crime rates have risen, but it is still
much lower than among other groups. See also Arthur Hirsch, Armstrong Williams,
Proud Republican, Broadcasts His Message, Black and Right, THE SUN (BALTIMORE),
Feb. 19, 1995, § TDY, at 1J.
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These proposals, and some others that could be added, are
pie-in-the-sky in the sense that the political will to adopt them is
not out there, nor is it likely to be in my lifetime. And I do
advocate that the judiciary undertake them. But they seem no
more unlikely than Professor Butler's proposals. And they are
really not so very different from his. The difference may be in
style. Mine are old-fashioned and familiar, thus not very
interesting. His are novel and intended to shock.
There is a familiar lesson in this discussion. Usually
shocking proposals are much better at drawing attention to
intractable problems. Of course, my remedies would readily be
sustained by the courts, and his would not, but when we are
discussing utopian ideas, that concern is of little moment.
Some African American leaders, notably Jesse Jackson, have
proposed reparations as a basic remedy for past discrimination
against blacks.'" Although very different and not inconsistent
with Professor Butler's proposals, this is an alternative remedy
in the sense that a lot of political power would again be needed to
enact it, so giving it top priority would suppress other remedies.
Comparing reparations with Professor Butler's proposals
highlights an aspect of affirmative action that gets insufficient
attention. I refer to the importance of who bears the cost of an
affirmative action measure, of whose ox is gored. A number of
Supreme Court cases deal with this issue, but the Court is badly
fractured, and the issue has limited focus."3
Suppose Congress enacted a plan for payment of reparations
to all descendants of persons who were lawfully enslaved in this
country. The plan would include most African Americans, and it
would be a racially exclusive class, or nearly so.' 4 Then suppose
an equal protection challenge were filed against the plan. On the
merits, would the plan pass the Supreme Court's test for remedial
12. See Jenifer Warren, Demanding Repayment for Slavery, L.A. TIMES, July
6, 1994, at Al.
13. Compare, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding racial preferences in layoffs invalid and that the
school board must use "means that do not impose disproportionate harm on the
interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals directly and
adversely affected by a plan's race preference'), with id. at 306-11 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (layoffs carried out legitimate remedial purpose), and id. at 313-19
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (layoffs carried out legitimate purpose of achieving multi-
ethnic faculty).
14. Some Native Americans were enslaved. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT
MIRROR: A HIsTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 58 (1993).
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justice?15 There is a good case to say no. The beneficiaries were
not themselves enslaved. The United States government was not
directly the wrongdoer, except in the District of Columbia, and its
present-day taxpayers did not participate in slavery. But would
any challenger have standing to attack the plan? I think not. 6
The other side of this coin is the absence of a sustainable case
to attack many instances of de facto discrimination against
persons of color.'7 This rule is one of the reasons why problems
between communities of color and the police are so resistant to
cure.' s In other words, much race-conscious action cannot be
successfully challenged in the courts.
By these criteria, Professor Butler's proposals would be
highly vulnerable. Making the death penalty and imprisonment
depend on the race of the accused would produce plenty of
challengers with standing, and his use of race is explicit.
Reparations would probably be constitutional.'9 And the possibil-
ity of their enactment is not any more remote than for Professor
Butler's measures. But, like my proposals, reparations are
humdrum and uninteresting.
Professor Butler's proposals raise another issue, again mainly
political. His discourse is almost entirely about white and black
Americans. Other communities of color are not part of the
picture. This omission raises a number of hard questions. He
says that in interracial cases when an African American is
accused, there must be a black majority on the jury and there can
be no death penalty.2" If the victim were black, these rules would
not apply. How would his proposals apply when the victim or the
accused is neither white nor black?
2'
Of course, these and other issues that can be raised about the
relation of these proposals to other races may be unimportant for
15. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2116-17 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 464, 493-94 (1989).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that a
federal taxpayer lacked standing to challenge the validity of statutes governing the
C.I.A.).
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
18. See Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Justice Process, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1494-1520 (1988). See generally SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE
COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 85-121 (1996).
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. See Butler, supra note 1, at 877.
21. See also Margaret E. Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices," White Supremacy,
and Affirmative Action: A Reply to Paul Butler, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 891 (1997).
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the reasons already cited. The proposals have no realistic chance
of enactment, so their force is rhetorical. Practical questions can
be set aside.
The O.J. Simpson trial should also inform our response to
these proposals. Over the last half century, the Supreme Court
has adopted constitutional rules that have fundamentally altered
the nature of criminal trials, arrests, and interrogations in this
country.22 All have been done ostensibly to promote fairness to
accused persons.23 Many of the rulings have indeed done that,
but others have been made so complex and technical that their
relation to fairness is dubious.24 Timothy McVeigh's counsel
recently moved to exclude eye-witness testimony from his trial.2"
This proposal would be astonishing in any trial system outside
this country.26
One result of these changes is that defendants with enough
money-including defendants of color-have a much better
chance of acquittal than other folks.27 We even have the remark-
able example of the Menendez brothers, who staved off conviction
when they had millions to spend, then were convicted after the
money ran out.2" Because of wealth differences among races, this
regime has disproportionate effects according to race. One test
we should impose on any proposal to aid defendants in criminal
cases is to ask if it would simply provide another way to acquit
the better off-in this case among African Americans-but do
nothing for the typical defendant. Helping country club defen-
dants cannot be a path to racial justice.
22. See CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVOLUTION 18-34 (1993).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 37-87.
25. See Jo Thomas, Truck Was Rented by Oklahoma Bomb Suspect, Witnesses
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at All. Of course, the motion may have been merely
a ploy for discovery purposes. But under prevailing rules, the trial judge thought
enough of it to hold an extensive hearing.
26. Some other countries use an exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct,
but none known to me would go so far as to exclude testimony of a lay witness. See,
e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 22, at 129-32; Mirjan Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to
Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 506, 521 (1973).
27. See JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON:
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE passim (4th ed. 1995).
28. See Alan Abrahamson, Cast Readies for Retrial of Menendez Brothers, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at B3; Ann W. O'Neill, Menendezes Given Consecutive Terms,
L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at B1.
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My final comment is a general plea on the subject of affirma-
tive action. Much of the debate is being carried on at the level of
grand abstraction. Opponents assert a principle of a color-blind
Constitution, despite the obvious consciousness of race that
permeates society. Proponents argue that the history of slavery
and discrimination justifies anything. The real problems require
attention to particulars that are badly obscured by appeals to
such moral absolutes.
2 9
29. For an example of needed, particularized analysis, see Professor Butler's
discussion of Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.),
which sustained racial preference in hiring a lieutenant for "boot camp" because of
the need for African Americans in authority at the camp. See Butler, supra note 1,
at 871-72.
